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Abstract 
In 2000, the West African Monetary Zone was formally established. The monetary zone has six 
members: The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Nigeria and Sierra Leone. The objective of the 
WAMZ was to establish a monetary union characterised by a common central bank and a single 
currency (the eco), which was to replace the existing national currencies of members. The 
proposed monetary union failed to commence after some few attempts, the last of which was in 
2015. The initial plan was that the WAMZ (of the Anglophone West African countries and 
Guinea) will merge will merge with the existing West African CFA zone franc shared by 
members of the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) to form a formidable 
monetary union across the whole of West Africa in the future as part of the African Economic Community’s six-stage process of achieving a monetary union and a single currency for Africa 
by 2028. The failed January 2015 take off of the WAMZ caused the Heads of States and 
Governments of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to change focus 
and strategy by relinquishing the initial plan of the WAMZ-WAEMU merger and replacing this 
with rescheduling the creation of a single currency for the 15-member ECOWAS countries by 
2020. Since WAEMU is already a monetary union with established single currency, common 
central bank and integrated monetary-fiscal policy interactions, the assessment of WAMZ (as 
the other integral part of West African sub-region) in these respects is necessary. Consequently, 
the focus of this paper is the evaluation the monetary-fiscal policies interactions in the WAMZ as 
well as establish the extent of monetary dominance as against fiscal dominance in the monetary 
zone. The modelling of monetary policy follows the standard Taylor rule which makes the 
nominal interest rate to depend on inflation and output gap. In monetary reaction function, 
Taylor (1993) proposed short term interest rate as monetary policy instrument in which the 
conjecture was that there would be increase in the Federal Fund rate if there is increase in 
inflation above its target or if there is increase in output gap above the value of its trend. On the 
fiscal side, this study applied the fiscal rule suggested by Davig and Leeper (2005, 2013) in 
which government revenue/GDP ratio reacts to government expenditure ratio, public debt ratio 
and output gap in modelling fiscal policy in the WAMZ. This study applied monthly data of 
monetary and fiscal policy rules. The applied monthly monetary and fiscal data for the WAMZ 
countries span from 2001M1 to 2015M12. The econometric estimation method employed is the 
regime switching regressions of Markov regime switching models of the Taylor monetary rule 
(augmented by interest rate smoothing) and of the fiscal rule suggested by Davig and Leeper 
(2005) augmented with lagged values of government revenue scaled by output. Estimation 
results are varied across the six WAMZ countries. Evidence gathered from the interactions of 
monetary and fiscal policies across the WAMZ are strong enough to suggest that The Gambia 
and Ghana have strong monetary dominance (the Ricardian equivalence) in the two estimated 
regimes. Nigeria, the lead economy only exhibit monetary dominance in Regime 1. All the 
WAMZ countries display monetary dominance in Regime 2 apart from Nigeria which manifests the ‘indeterminacy’ status in Regime 2. None of the WAMZ countries have the explosive and the ‘Non-Ricardian’ postures. Given the high probability of staying in either of the regime, for the six 
WAMZ countries, these results are good enough for the membership of the proposed monetary 
integration of West Africa. 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
The Economic Community of West African (ECOWAS)  has a long term objective of 
establishing an economic and monetary union between all member countries.When 
ECOWAS revised its Treaty in 1993, the crucial aim was to accelerate the economic 
integration process and strengthen political cooperation. The revised objectives 
heralded the formation  of a second monetary zone, the West African Monetary Zone 
(WAMZ) which formally came into existence on 15 December, 2000 when five 
prospective member countries (The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria and Sierra Leone) 
signed the Articles of Agreement of the zone. This Accra Declaration established the 
WAMZ. At ECOWAS, the thinking was that the successful launch of the WAMZ would aid 
the merger with the CFA zone and that this would usher-in the ECOWAS single 
currency, the eco. The establishment of a monetary union characterised by a common 
central bank and a single currency (the eco) which is to replace the existing five national 
currencies is the main objective of the WAMZ which was initially scheduled to take-off 
in January 2003. Liberia later joined the WAMZ. 
A mid-term convergence assessment in 2002 revealed that despite some achievements 
by WAMZ member countries, these were not adequate enough support the take-off of 
the monetary union in January 2003. A major problem was the inadequate commitment 
of member countries of WAMZ to support their commitment expressed with actions. 
This consequently led to the extension of the WAMZ programme to 30 June, 2005 so 
that the common central bank and the common currency would take off on 1 July 2005. 
Another deadline of 31 December, 2009 was set so that the single currency and the 
common central bank would be effective from 1 January 2010. Due to same reasons this 
could not be met. The official reason for this action was stated as "the global economic 
and financial crisis which has put constraints on member state's ability to meet the 
convergence criteria individually and collectively". The last agreed take off date of 1 
January 2015 actually became unrealistic and failed. This caused the Heads of States and 
Governments of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to change 
focus and strategy by relinquishing the initial plan of the WAMZ-WAEMU merger and 
replacing this with rescheduling the creation of a single currency for the 15-member 
ECOWAS countries by 2020.  
The making of monetary policy and fiscal policy are two distinct functions of 
government. While monetary policy action relates to how a central bank controls 
nominal interest rates and money supply to impact economic conditions, fiscal policy is 
about the decision of government to raise revenue (tax) and about how proceeds from 
revenues are to be spent. The contention here is in the conflicts of the objectives and 
targets of these policies and their instruments as well as the coordination of the two 
policies. Two major factors highlighted as the causes of the non-alignments in the two policies are: (1) policy’s institutional structure; and (2) the credibility of the principal 
actors. These (and other factors) make the interactions of the two policies of 
government to be cloudy and complete and more complex in the cases of monetary 
unions. As already indicated, the loss of monetary independence is a cost of joining a 
monetary union. If a monetary union is to be successful, price stability of member state 
should be made paramount; and with the loss of monetary powers at national levels, 
fiscal policy remains the only instrument available at national levels to maintain price 
stability. The loss of monetary sovereignty thus increases the potential role of fiscal 
policy as instrument of economic output stabilisation. The effectiveness of fiscal policy 
(in counteracting asymmetric and real economic shocks) is a strong determinant of the 
success of a monetary union. 
In a monetary union, respective objectives and functions of common monetary policy 
and several national fiscal policies are clearly specified. Usually, the primary objective of a monetary union’s monetary policy is the maintenance of price stability within the area 
covered by such monetary integration. On fiscal policy side, individual national 
authority is responsible for the commitment towards ensuring sound public finance, 
even if there are formal laid-down framework for fiscal coordination and other fiscal 
policy requirements across the monetary union. Towards the achievement of the overall 
goals of a monetary union, it is necessary for monetary and fiscal policies to interact 
well. One of the instance of monetary policy interactions with the fiscal policy is when a 
well formulated monetary policy (with its focus on price stability) promotes the 
stability of inflation expectations and ensures the achievement of low inflation risks 
premia. These together assist in reducing the level of long term interest rates and its volatility which in turn, benefits government’s debt servicing costs. On the other hand, 
there are effects of fiscal policy on monetary policy when the supply side of the 
economy is shaped by tax regime adopted or when long term interest rate is influenced 
through public debt, making the demand side effect of fiscal policy to directly be on 
inflation outlook. Nevertheless, there are complications and complexities arising out of 
these owing to the feature of monetary unions in which there is a single monetary policy 
for many fiscal policies. 
The formation of a monetary union (or the plan to form a monetary union) would raise 
some question about the combination of (and co-ordination of) monetary policy and 
fiscal policy as well as the determination of the optimal mix of the two economic 
policies. Member countries of such monetary union (or prospective monetary union), 
each with its own fiscal spending and revenue policy, are (will be) joined together by a 
single monetary policy in countries with varied population of private economic agents. 
Crucial questions that come to mind are: (a) if such common monetary policy has (or 
will have) same impact in each of the member countries; (b) if the effects on these 
countries would be according to their degree of public debts and sizes of these 
countries; and (c) how the separate fiscal policies affect (or will affect) the ability of the 
common central bank to control inflation and achieve its inflation targeting objective. 
These questions and concerns necessitate the investigation of policy mix in a monetary 
union member countries (or proposed member countries) in order to reveal in the 
economic regime is monetary dominant or fiscal dominant. 
In spite of all these, a major issue of concern is that in a monetary union, national 
governments face a budget constraints and their decision-making is based on national 
variables while the supra monetary institution focuses on union-wide average variables. 
This makes the reaction of national governments to monetary policy and supply shocks 
not univocal.  
Since WAEMU is already a monetary union with established single currency, common 
central bank and monetary-fiscal policy interactions, the assessment of WAMZ (as the 
other integral part of West African sub-region) in these respects is necessary. 
Consequently, the main objective of this paper is the investigation of the forms of the 
mix of monetary and fiscal policy that has sharpened the past across the WAMZ, through 
the assessments of monetary-fiscal policies interactions in the monetary zone as well as 
establish the extent of both monetary dominance as against fiscal dominance in the 
monetary zone. 
2.1 Theory and Model 
Leeper (1991) classified the behaviours of fiscal and monetary authorities as portrayed 
by the theories are classified into two forms by Leeper (1999) as: (i) ‘passive’ and (ii) ‘active’. In general terms, Leeper (2016) connotes ‘active’ as a situation where the policy authority has the freedom to pursue its objective while ‘passive’ means the policy 
authority generates constraints through the active authority’s behaviour and the price sector. These are from his FTPL’s points of view. Since the two fundamental basic tasks 
of macroeconomic policies are: (a) to determine inflation; and (ii) to ensure debt 
stability. Leeper (2016) highlights the two different mixes of the interplay of monetary 
and fiscal behaviours that can guarantee the delivery of these two fundamental tasks: 
(a) active monetary policy with passive fiscal policy; and (b) active fiscal policy with 
passive monetary policy. Under aggressive inflation targeting regime (like in monetary 
unions), the policy combination of active monetary policy and passive fiscal policy 
(depicting monetary dominance) is appropriately necessary because under such 
policies combination, fiscal policy shocks would not be able to affect the price level. 
Simply put, under such regime, central bank raises nominal interest rate sharply 
whenever inflation rises (determination of inflation/price level) and then inform fiscal 
authority to ensure that whenever government debt rises, it should raise budget 
surpluses in future in order to finance that debt (debt stabilisation). When active fiscal 
policy is combined with passive monetary policy, policy makers set surplus largely 
independent of the levels of government debt and inflation condition. The fiscal 
behaviour eventually determines the price level. Debt would then be stabilised when 
the monetary authority allows the surprise changes in inflation and prices of bonds to 
adjust the value of government debt (revaluation of government debt). This results into government debt’s market value being equal to the present value of future surplus. 
Here, the monetary authority does not attempt at fighting inflation. 
Monetary Regime (or M-Regime) and Fiscal Regime (or Fiscal Regime) are the two regimes borne out of the summary of Leeper’s propositions of the mix of the policies, described as ‘consistent with a determinant equilibrium’. The equilibrium in the M-
Regime relates to the conventional assignment of the two tasks of monetary control of 
inflation (for monetary policy) and fiscal assurance of government solvency (for fiscal 
policy). This is believed to be a common model of central bank. The assignment of the 
two tasks is flipped in the F-Regime in which monetary policy is tasked with debt 
stabilisation and the price level determination is left with fiscal policy, thus altering the 
roles of the two policies. Table 1 below summarises the policies mix of price level 
determination and debt stabilisation. 
Table 1: The Regimes of Two-Policy Mix of Price Determination and Debt Stabilisation 
 The Nature of M-Regime The Nature of F-Regime 
Monetary Policy 
Actions 
In targeting inflation, 
nominal interest rate is 
raised more than one-for-one 
with inflation. 
In response to inflation, 
nominal interest rate is 
weakly adjusted in order to 
ensure that debt is not 
destabilised by interest 
payments on government 
debts. 
Fiscal Policy Actions Revenues (taxes) are raised 
when there is enough 
increase in real government 
debt to cover real debt 
services and eventually 
retire the increase in the 
principal value of debt. 
Revenues (taxes) are made 
irresponsive to the state of 
government indebtedness 
and price level. 
Label Active monetary policy and 
passive fiscal policy. 
Monetary Dominance 
Active fiscal policy and 
passive monetary policy. 
Fiscal Dominance 
      Source: Leeper, (2016) The central point being stressed by Leeper’s the active/passive framework is that there 
are different ways of determining the price levels, given the parameters of monetary 
and fiscal policy. In the M-Regime of active monetary policy and passive fiscal policy, the 
determination of the price level is governed by the quantity theory of money or the New 
Keynesian view of monetary policy, while in the F-Regime of active fiscal policy and 
passive monetary policy, the FTPL governs the determination of the price level. A very 
crucial and important state that in both regimes, stability emanates from a passive 
policy that is able to accommodate the policy actions taken by the active authority. It is 
therefore necessary for an inflation targeting central bank to be confident that the behaviour of fiscal policy would be ‘passive’. Nevertheless, a vital point to note 
(particularly, in cases of monetary unions) is that the control of inflation by monetary 
policy requires the appropriate support/backing of fiscal policy, hence the need for the 
policies to interact well in order to achieve the two macroeconomic goals and avert 
economic crisis.  
Leeper’s model sees monetary policy goal as ‘guiding inflation towards its target’. 
Therefore, a monetary policy is active when it is tight, contractionary and if the policy 
decisions guide inflation to its target. Monetary policy is passive when there is 
divergence from inflation target. On fiscal side, fiscal policy is active when it is loose, 
expansionary and allows budget deficit higher than the sustainable budget deficit; but 
passive when the policy is tight, contractionary and ensures long term equilibrium. 
What is drawn from these is the distinction in the domination of the economy, between 
monetary domination and fiscal domination. Table 2 below reveals the clear distinction 
between a monetary dominance and fiscal dominance regimes. 
Table 2: Distinction between Monetary Dominance and Fiscal Dominance 
Monetary Dominance 
(M-Regime): 
*Fiscal policy exhibits 
‘Ricardian equivalence’; 
*Monetary policy 
follows its inflation 
target path. 
 
Active 
Monetary 
Policy 
Monetary authority pursues its inflation target 
independent of fiscal policies. 
Tight, contractionary monetary policy 
Passive Fiscal 
Policy 
Fiscal authority determines tax and spending 
levels, independent of GIBC consideration. 
Loose and expansionary fiscal policy 
Fiscal Dominance (F-
Regime): 
*Fiscal policy exhibits 
‘non-Ricardian 
equivalence; 
*Fiscal policy 
significantly affects 
inflation and price 
stability; 
*Monetary policy 
ensures public debt 
stability; 
FTPL holds. 
Active Fiscal 
Policy 
Fiscal authority effects tax and expenditure 
changes in order to balance the budget 
intertemporaly. 
Fiscal policy allows long run unsustainable and 
excessively budget deficit higher than the 
sustainable budget deficit. 
Loose and expansionary fiscal policy. 
Passive 
Monetary 
Policy  
Monetary authority sets interest rates to 
accommodate fiscal policy. 
Loose, expansionary monetary policy 
Source: Leeper, (2016) 
In an F-regime of fiscal dominance, whenever there is a rise in price level due to 
expansionary fiscal shock, monetary growth would passively increase equally because 
the monetary authority is compelled to accommodate the fiscal shock. If the long term 
government budget balance is to be maintained under this regime in which fiscal policy 
allows long run unsustainable and excessively high budget deficits, the proposition of Leeper’s model is that inflation target of central bank would be abandoned, and the 
central bank gives room for the emergence of higher inflation (that is, expansionary 
monetary policy). This consequently causes the monetary authority to either inflate the 
public debt or work towards generating seigniorage revenue that could be transferred to the fiscal side (budget). This thus reflect FD as a phenomenon of government’s long 
term sustainability (when primary balance is not kept at equilibrium) and higher 
inflation is generated (than warranted) and original target of monetary policy is 
abandoned when loose (passive) monetary policy is adopted. It should be noted that it is an underlying assumption of the FTPL that government’s actions are not constrained 
by budgetary issues; and according to FTPL (which holds in a FD regime), fiscal policy 
determines prices when there are no budgetary adjustments in response to fiscal 
shocks affecting the government intertemporal budget constraints (GIBC) thus reflecting the ‘non-Ricardian’ behaviour in which price is made to adjust to balance the 
budget constraints. Hence, fiscal policy plays a more important role than monetary 
policy in ensuring price stability and in determining inflation in a FD regime. Therefore, 
under such regime, fiscal policy changes must impact the price level regardless of the 
degree of monetary authority’s commitment to price stability. In this ‘non-Ricardian’ 
fiscal policy situation, there could be high inflation and price instability. This appears 
not to be the best option for monetary unions. In an M-regime of monetary dominance, 
the central bank focuses on its inflation targeting goal while a passive and expansionary 
fiscal policy is in place to avoid the disruption to fiscal policy long term sustainability. In 
targeting inflation, if a monetary policy specifies the form and direction of interest rate 
movement in response to specific inflation and growth deviations, there could be 
stable/low inflation if fiscal policy is not considered when such fiscal policy displays ‘Ricardian’ behaviour. This is an instance of the implication of the FTPL. Leeper (1999) considers this policy mix as ‘default’ and as one that can guarantee stable policy 
combination. This is deemed more appropriate for monetary unions. However, when 
both policies are active, such expansionary fiscal shocks are addressed by monetary 
policy to some extent. 
In the event of monetary integration when the monetary policy formulation will be 
transferred to a supra-national level and the formulation of fiscal policies (of members 
states) remains at national levels, the competing views or rather, the interactions of 
monetary and fiscal policies and how they affect inflation under two conflicting fiscal 
dominance and monetary dominance regimes are very crucial and relevant for policy 
makers at both national and supra-national levels within such monetary integrated bloc. 
Specifically, FTPL could be of interest to monetary unions (and the WAMZ) because it 
will contribute in revealing and explaining the pattern of price level evolution across 
such monetary unions, particularly in member states. There are fiscal limitations 
imposed on existing and proposed members of existing and proposed monetary unions so as to ensure that the ‘Ricardian regime’ and ‘monetary dominance’ are 
institutionalised. 
In this assessment, the modelling of monetary policy follows the standard Taylor rule 
which makes the nominal interest rate to depend on inflation and output gap. In the 
monetary reaction function, Taylor (1993) proposed short term interest rate as 
monetary policy instrument in which the conjecture was that there would be increase in 
the Federal Fund rate if there is increase in inflation above its target or if there is increase in output gap above the value of its trend. The Taylor’s modelling of the 
nominal interest rate rule is simply given as:  𝑖 = 𝑓(𝜋 + 𝑦𝑔)                                                                      1  
where 𝑖 is nominal interest rate, 𝜋 is inflation and is 𝑦𝑔 output gap. Nevertheless, it is 
worthy of note to state that Taylor (1993) did not perform econometric estimation of 
the reaction function but only attach equal of value of 0.5 coefficients to inflation and 
output gap. Although, results generated in the estimation of the central bank reaction 
function by Taylor (1993) generated varied results, however, the common interpretation of Taylor rule is that inflation gap’s weigh should be greater than unity 
(1) in order to show that real interest rate is raised by monetary authority in 
responding to higher inflation and the below-normal level of output requires lower 
interest rates. Monetary behaviour and the correlation between expected inflation, nominal interest rate and real interest rate (as established by ‘Fisher Equation’) could 
both be captured by this empirical relationship linking nominal interest rate with 
inflation and output. 
On the fiscal side, this study applied the fiscal rule suggested by Davig and Leeper 
(2005, 2013) in which government revenue/GDP ratio reacts to government 
expenditure ratio, public debt ratio and output gap in the modelling of fiscal policy. This 
is depicted as: 𝑟 = 𝑓(𝑙𝑏 + 𝑦𝑔 + 𝑔)                                                                        2 
Where 𝑟 is government revenue/GDP ratio, is 𝑙𝑏 one-period lagged public debt/GDP 
ratio, is 𝑦𝑔 output gap and is 𝑔 government expenditure/GDP ratio. Making fiscal 
revenue to be function of lagged debt could say something about how revenue (taxes) 
are raised by fiscal authority to respond to public debt increases and as well establish 
the positive correlation created by GIBC between public debt and future primary 
surpluses. 
3.1 Data and Methods 
This study applied monthly data of monetary and fiscal policy rules. These data for the 
WAMZ countries which span from 2001M1 to 2015M12 were obtained from the 
databases of IMF World Bank and the Economic Intelligence Unit (EIU). Inflation rate, 
defined as log difference in GDP deflator was lagged over the past twelve months while 
public debt GDP was lagged in same manner. The nominal interest rate was taken to be 
the money market rates for these countries. Output gap was estimated as log deviation 
of real output from the potential as derived through the application of Hodrick-Prescott 
(H-P) filtering method with lambda (𝜆) = 14,400, which is appropriate for monthly data. 
Fiscal variables used are government revenue, public debt and government expenditure 
(all, as share of GDP). All data employed sourced as annual data were converted to monthly values using Eviews’ ‘linear-match’ specification. For the monetary policy 
regime estimations, lagged values of dependent variable (nominal interest rate) was 
included on the right hand side of the estimated model in order to account for interest 
rate smoothing. Equally for fiscal regimes, as regressor, lagged value of the dependent 
variable (revenue/GDP ratio) was included so as to remove possible residual 
autocorrelation. In these tests of monetary dominance and assessment of the nature of 
monetary-fiscal policy interactions and to account for possible change in monetary and 
fiscal regimes in the WAMZ, the econometric estimation method employed is the 
Markov regime switching regression models of the Taylor monetary rule (augmented by 
interest rate for smoothing) and of the fiscal rule suggested by Davig and Leeper (2006) 
augmented with lagged values of government revenue scaled by output. Empirical 
characterisation of policy behaviour (according to these rules) were established while 
allowing for regime changes. Monetary and fiscal policy were allowed to switch 
independent of each other. With the view that there is always discrete shift in policy 
behaviour, we can differentiate between policy behaviour that is time variant and other 
equilibrium conditions that do not display time, but which coincides with policy shifts. 
The regime switching regression of monetary policy (Taylor rule) estimated for these 
WAMZ countries is specified as: 𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0(𝑆𝑡𝑀) + 𝛼𝜋(𝑆𝑡𝑀)𝜋𝑡 + 𝛼𝑦𝑔(𝑆𝑡𝑀)𝑦𝑔𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖𝑡(𝑆𝑡𝑀)𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜎𝑚(𝑆𝑡𝑀)𝜀𝑡𝑚               3 
Where 𝑖𝑡 is nominal interest rate, 𝜋𝑡  is inflation, 𝑦𝑔𝑡 is output gap, as the lagged value of 
interest rate (𝑖𝑡−1) is for interest rate smoothing meant to address interest rate inertia, 𝑆𝑡𝑀 represents the monetary policy regime which follows a two state Markov chain with 
its transition matrix 𝑃𝑀 , while 𝜀𝑡𝑚 is the disturbance with normal distribution and zero 
mean. Independent of the coefficients in the monetary rule, the variance of the error 
switches between two different values. The assumption here is that parameters 𝛼0, 𝛼𝜋, 
and 𝛼𝑦𝑔 are time varying. The variance of the shock is not constant but has Markov-
switching property. From the estimation of the above monetary rule, the situation of ‘active’ monetary policy is established when the coefficient estimates of inflation is 
greater than one (𝜋𝑡 ≥ 1). Conversely, the monetary rule is ‘passive’ if this coefficient is 
less than unity (𝜋𝑡 ≤ 1).  Monetary policy stance changes over time. This prompts the 
question on how the behaviour of fiscal policy would be in the same period. Answer to 
this question would reveal if these policies are ‘accommodative’ or ‘counteractive’ to 
each other. Therefore, for clear understanding of the policy mix in the six WAMZ 
countries, it is relevant to equally account for possible changes in fiscal regimes in these 
countries. 
There are two broadly used strands of fiscal policy rules: (i) the fiscal rule in which the 
value of the primary budget deficit allows public debt ratio stabilisation (Bohn, 1998) ; 
and (ii) the fiscal rule in which government revenue/GDP ratio reacts to government 
expenditure ratio, public debt ratio and output gap (Davig and Leeper (2005, 2013). 
This research applied the second strand. The fiscal counterpart of Equation 3 above 
would reflect the regime switching fiscal policy rule expressed as: 𝑟𝑡 = 𝛾0(𝑆𝑡𝐹) + 𝛾𝑏(𝑆𝑡𝐹)𝑏𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝑦(𝑆𝑡𝐹)𝑦𝑡 + 𝛾𝑔(𝑆𝑡𝐹)𝑔𝑡 + 𝜎𝑟(𝑆𝑡𝐹)𝜀𝑡𝑟                      4 
where 𝑟𝑡 is the government revenue/output ratio, 𝑏𝑡−1 is one-period lagged public 
debt/output ratio, 𝛾𝑔 is the government expenditure, 𝛾𝑦 is the output gap, 𝜀𝑡𝑟 is the 
disturbance term with normal distribution and zero mean while 𝑆𝑡𝐹 is the fiscal regime 
that follows a Markov chain with transition matrix 𝑃𝐹 . The fiscal rule modeling allows 
the variance of the errors to switch between two values. The assumption here is that 
parameters 𝛾0, 𝛾𝑏 , 𝛾𝑦 and 𝛾𝑔 are time varying and that the variance of the shock is not 
constant but has Markov-switching property. The Leeper’s (1991) FTPL specifies that a fiscal regime is ‘passive’ when the estimated coefficient of debt/output ratio is positive 
and statistically significant (𝛾𝑏 ≥ 1), implying that increase in the stock of outstanding 
public debt would cause significant reduction in government deficits. On the other hand, 
an active fiscal policy regime is established if (𝛾𝑏 ≤ 1); and this is when the fiscal 
authority is not constrained by the level of public debt.  At this point, this study follows 
the method of joint matrix estimation proposed by Davig and Leeper (2009) in which 
the joint transition probability matrix governing the monetary-fiscal regime in the 
WAMZ was estimated as: 𝑃𝑀𝐹 = 𝑃𝑀 ⊗ 𝑃𝐹                                                                                 5 
where 𝑃𝑀𝐹  is the joint transition matrix which indicates the mix of monetary policy and 
fiscal policy, reflecting the interactions between the two macroeconomic policies within 
the WAMZ, 𝑃𝑀 and 𝑃𝐹  respectively, are the transition matrix for monetary policy and 
fiscal policy. From the estimated joint transition matrix, the monetary-fiscal policy 
interaction could be interpreted as reflected in Table 3 below.   
Table 3: Monetary-Fiscal Policy Mix Implications 
 Active Monetary Policy Passive Monetary Policy 
Active Fiscal Policy Explosive Non-Ricardian (FTPL) 
Passive Fiscal Policy Ricardian Indeterminacy 
Source: Leeper (2007) 
The explosive policy mix is unsustainable as both monetary and fiscal policies are ‘active’. The indeterminacy mix is when both policies are ‘passive’. For monetary unions 
(in which monetary policy and fiscal policies are at the supra-national and national levels respectively), the ‘Ricardian’ mix of the interactions between the two 
macroeconomic policies is deemed to be the best. 
4.1 Results and Findings  
The results of the Markov regime switching regressions for both monetary and fiscal 
policy regimes in the WAMZ are exhibited in Table 4 below. 
Table 4: Results of Markov Switching Regressions of Monetary and Fiscal Policies Regimes in the 
WAMZ Countries 
Monetary Rule Regimes Switching 
Variables Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia Nigeria S/Leone 
Constant: 
State 1: 
State 2: 
Inflation: 
State1  
State 2 
Output Gap: 
State1:  
State 2: 
Interest Rate Smoothing: 
State1:  
State 2: 
Transition Probability: 
P11: 
P22: 
Expected Duration: 
State 1: 
State 2: 
Standard Deviation (Sigma): 
AIC: 
HQIC: 
SBIC: 
Log Likelihood: 
 
6.3176* 
5.3892* 
 
619.9587* 
358.0398* 
 
-11.6994* 
2.8125 
 
0.4941* 
0.4519* 
 
0.95 
0.98 
 
19.78 
44.23 
0.10* 
3.35 
3.44 
3.56 
-270.66 
 
-0.0366 
7.9482* 
 
518.8409* 
436.6295* 
 
45.3135*** 
-51.4353 
 
0.4081* 
0.4191* 
 
0.96 
0.96 
 
25.72 
30.67 
0.47* 
4.14 
4.22 
4.35 
-337.16 
 
19.7330* 
0.6409 
 
-72.541** 
171.3730* 
 
650.8563* 
98.3488* 
 
-0.080*** 
0.6409* 
 
0.98 
0.97 
 
60.30 
48.53 
0.17* 
3.45 
3.53 
3.66 
-279.03 
 
0.09397* 
0.4074* 
 
-7.3280 
48.8968* 
 
5.1947* 
-3.8306 
 
0.7808* 
0.5985* 
 
0.97 
0.96 
 
38.56 
26.90 
-1.46* 
0.22 
0.31 
0.43 
-8.26 
 
1.2505* 
6.9404* 
 
71.9769* 
-35.7580 
 
116.4321* 
228.1941*** 
 
0.6706* 
0.6370* 
 
0.99 
0.96 
 
68.90 
29.85 
0.28* 
3.66 
3.74 
3.86 
-296.18 
 
-0.5700 
9.2570* 
 
-85.8522* 
728.5705* 
 
-1780.55* 
142.600** 
 
0.6550* 
0.0950 
 
0.97 
0.96 
 
29.23 
26.64 
0.82* 
4.86 
4.95 
5.07 
-397.54 
Fiscal Rule Regimes Switching 
Variables Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia Nigeria S/Leone 
Constant: 
State 1: 
State 2: 
Public Debt/GDP: 
State1  
State 2 
Govt. Expenditure/GDP: 
State1:  
State 2: 
Output Gap: 
State1:  
State 2: 
Lagged Govt. Revenue/GDP: 
State1:  
State 2 
Transition Probability: 
P11: 
P22: 
Expected Duration: 
State 1: 
State 2: 
Standard Deviation (Sigma): 
AIC: 
HQIC: 
SBIC: 
Log Likelihood: 
 
4.0109* 
1.2346** 
 
-0.004 
0.0169* 
 
0.4894* 
0.5591* 
 
-30.9041* 
-66.8563* 
 
0.2409* 
0.2043* 
 
0.97 
0.97 
 
37.25 
48.54 
-0.47* 
2.23 
2.33 
2.47 
-174.33 
 
0.7454* 
26.9125* 
 
0.0410* 
-0.1168* 
 
0.2129* 
0.2450* 
 
82.3639* 
122.8293* 
 
0.5986* 
-0.5109 
 
0.98 
0.97 
 
55.01 
35.38 
-1.71* 
-0.25 
-0.16 
-0.01 
34.36 
 
11.4237* 
13.0254* 
 
-0.0010 
-0.0013* 
 
0.4771* 
0.6097* 
 
271.6433* 
40.1287* 
 
-0.6623 
-0.2850* 
 
0.96 
0.98 
 
25.99 
61.60 
-4.10 
2.30 
2.39 
2.54 
-179.93 
 
19.6979* 
-6.3574* 
 
-0.0090* 
0.0072 
 
0.1843* 
0.1893* 
 
25.8408* 
3.0609** 
 
0.1430 
1.0290* 
 
0.97 
0.97 
 
30.51 
29.82 
-0.52* 
2.15 
2.25 
2.39 
-167.44 
 
4.3896* 
0.4661* 
 
-0.0285* 
0.0172* 
 
0.6292* 
0.7474* 
 
-10.9854** 
93.8618* 
 
-0.2579* 
-0.0949** 
 
0.98 
0.99 
 
62.10 
125.16 
-4.82* 
0.08 
0.18 
0.33 
5.87 
 
4.8721* 
4.7851* 
 
-0.0137* 
0.0147* 
 
0.5313* 
0.5666* 
 
-115.523* 
-59.907* 
 
0.0163 
-0.0465 
 
0.94 
0.96 
 
17.40 
27.55 
-1.18 
0.87 
0.87 
1.12 
-60.64 
Source: Author's Estimation and Eviews 9.5 Output 
 
As reflected in the results of the maximum likelihood estimations of Markov switching 
monetary and fiscal regimes, active and passive regimes across the WAMZ can be 
determined. State of variance (as measured by standard deviation for the policies 
parameters) are not uniform but all positive and significant at 1% level under monetary 
policy regime and all negative and significant at 1% except in the cases of Guinea and 
Sierra Leone. 
In monetary policy Regime 1, monetary policy is active only in The Gambia, Ghana and 
Nigeria and active in all the WAMZ countries except Nigeria in State 2 as highlighted in 
the reaction of nominal interest rate to inflation. These results are statistically 
significant at 1% and 10% levels of significance apart from Liberia in State 1 and Nigeria 
in State 2. The estimation results show high transition probabilities (of between 0.95 
and 0.98) of staying in Regime 1 and Regime 2. Nigeria, the lead economy in the 
monetary zone exhibits the highest duration of 68.90 months of staying in State 1, while 
The Gambia came up with the highest duration is State 2. Interest rate smoothing is 
positive (except in Guinea) and statistically significant across the WAMZ. The log 
likelihood values are between -8.26 and -397.54. From the results of the maximum 
likelihood estimations of fiscal policy Markov regime switching, fiscal policy is passive 
in Regime 1 and Regime 2 in all the WAMZ countries, though not statistically significant 
in the cases of The Gambia and Guinea (in State 1) and Liberia (in State 2) as reflected in 
the response of government revenue to public debt. In fiscal regime switching 
estimation across the WAMZ, the probability of staying in both regimes are very high 
between 0.94 and 0.99, just aa obtained in the monetary rule estimations. As evident in 
the monetary regime, Nigeria (the lead economy) also demonstrated the longest 
expected duration of staying in both fiscal policy regimes with log likelihood values of 
5.87. However, it is shown that Guinea, Ghana and Liberia recorded high and 
statistically significant attention of fiscal authorities to output stabilisation in State 1 
while such attention were given by Ghana, Nigeria and Guinea in State 2. This shows 
that Guinea has the possibility of consistence in fiscal attention to output stabilisation. 
The likelihood values are within the space of 5.87 and -179.93 in the fiscal regime 
estimations.  
The summary the outcome the Markov regime switching regression of the WAMZ 
countries in the two regimes are displayed in Table 5 below.  
Table 5: Monetary-Fiscal Policy Mix Implications for the WAMZ Countries 
Regime 1 
Country Monetary Regime Fiscal Regime Implications 
The Gambia Active Passive Monetary Dominance (Ricardian) 
Ghana Active Passive Monetary Dominance (Ricardian) 
Guinea Passive Passive Indeterminacy 
Liberia Passive Passive Indeterminacy 
Nigeria Active Passive Monetary Dominance (Ricardian) 
S/Leone Passive Passive Indeterminacy 
Regime 2 
Country Monetary Regime Fiscal Regime Implication 
The Gambia Active Passive Monetary Dominance (Ricardian) 
Ghana Active Passive Monetary Dominance (Ricardian) 
Guinea Active Passive Monetary Dominance (Ricardian) 
Liberia Active Passive Monetary Dominance (Ricardian) 
Nigeria Passive Passive Indeterminacy 
S/Leone Active Passive Monetary Dominance (Ricardian) Source: Author’s Interpretations 
The summary of reveals that in both regimes only The Gambia and Ghana exhibit 
monetary dominance (the Ricardian Equivalence) with is the strongest for membership of a monetary union. Although, the monetary zone’s lead economy, Nigeria displays 
monetary dominance in Regime 1, the country shows an indeterminacy status in 
Regime 2. All the WAMZ countries (except Nigeria) exhibit monetary dominance in 
Regime 2. None of the WAMZ countries simultaneously demonstrates the ‘indeterminacy’ or the ‘explosive’ status in both regimes. Given the implications of the 
monetary-fiscal policy interactions in the mix in both regime, one point to highlight 
regarding the switching is that the probability of switching from one regime to the other 
is very low across the WAMZ, while by implications, the probability of remaining in any 
of the two regimes is very high between 0.94 and 0.99. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6: Monetary and Fiscal Policies Regimes Transition Probability Matrices of the WAMZ Countries 
Country Regimes Transition Matrices 
 
 
 
 
Gambia 
𝑃𝑀 = [0.9494  0.05060.0226   0.9774  ]            𝑃𝐹 = [0.9732  0.02680.0206   0.9794  ]      
 
𝑃𝑀𝐹 = 𝑃𝑀 ⊗ 𝑃𝐹=  [0.9239   0.02540.0196   0.92980.0220   0.00060.0005   0.0221
   0.0492  0.0013    0.0010   0.0495    0.9521    0.0262     0.0201   0.9573]   
 
 
 
 
Ghana 
𝑃𝑀 = [0.9411  0.03890.0326  0.9674  ]              𝑃𝐹 = [ 0.9818  0.01820.0283   0.9717  ] 
 
𝑃𝑀𝐹 = 𝑃𝑀 ⊗ 𝑃𝐹=  [0.9436   0.01750.0272   0.93390.0320   0.00050.0009   0.0317
   0.0382  0.0007    0.0011   0.0378    0.9498    0.0176     0.0274   0.9400] 
 
 
 
 
Guinea 
𝑃𝑀 = [0.9834  0.01660.0206  0.9794  ]              𝑃𝐹 = [ 0.9615  0.03850.0162   0.9838  ] 
 
𝑃𝑀𝐹 = 𝑃𝑀 ⊗ 𝑃𝐹=  [0.9455   0.00060.0159   0.96740.0198   0.00070.0003   0.0203
   0.0160  0.0006    0.0003   0.0163    0.9417    0.0377     0.0159   0.9635] 
 
 
 
 
Liberia 
𝑃𝑀 = [0.9741  0.02590.0372  0.9628  ]              𝑃𝐹 = [ 0.9672  0.03280.0335   0.9665  ] 
 
𝑃𝑀𝐹 = 𝑃𝑀 ⊗ 𝑃𝐹=  [0.9421   0.03190.0326   0.94150.0358   0.00120.0012   0.0360
   0.0251  0.0008    0.0009   0.0250    0.9312    0.0316     0.0322   0.9305] 
 
 
 
 
Nigeria 
𝑃𝑀 = [0.9855  0.01450.0335  0.9665  ]              𝑃𝐹 = [ 0.9839  0.01610.0080   0.9920  ] 
 
𝑃𝑀𝐹 = 𝑃𝑀 ⊗ 𝑃𝐹=  [0.9696   0.01590.0079   0.97760.0330   0.00050.0003   0.0332
   0.0143  0.0002    0.0001   0.0144    0.9509    0.0156     0.0077   0.9588] 
 
 
 
 
S/Leone 
𝑃𝑀 = [0.9658  0.03420.0375  0.9625  ]              𝑃𝐹 = [ 0.9425  0.05750.0363   0.9637  ] 
 
𝑃𝑀𝐹 = 𝑃𝑀 ⊗ 𝑃𝐹=  [0.9103   0.05550.0351   0.93070.0353   0.00220.0014   0.0361
   0.0322  0.0020    0.0012   0.0330    0.9071    0.0553     0.0349   0.9276] 
Source: Author's Estimation and Eviews 9.5 Output 
The transition probability matrices of the two regimes of monetary policy and fiscal 
policy across the WAMZ over the estimation period is displayed in Table 6 above which 
also reflects the joint transition probability matrices estimation of Equation 5 for the six 
countries over the period covered by the study. The joint regime transition probability 
matrices in Table 6 above still reflect very high probabilities of remaining in both 
regimes. These probabilities are in 90% percentages as shown in the estimations. The 
Markov switching smoothed regime probability patterns for the six WAMZ countries are 
reflected in Figures 1 to Figure 12 in Appendix 1 and Appendix 2. 
1.6 Conclusions 
This paper tests for monetary dominance and evaluates the monetary-fiscal policies 
interactions in the WAMZ. The modelling of monetary policy follows the standard 
Taylor rule which makes the nominal interest rate to depend on inflation and output 
gap. The modelling of the fiscal policy followed the fiscal rule suggested by Davig and 
Leeper (2006, 2013) in which government revenue/GDP ratio reacts to government 
expenditure ratio, public debt ratio and output gap. Appropriate relevant monthly data 
of monetary and fiscal policy rules were employed in the econometric estimation of 
Markov regime switching regression of the models of the monetary rule (augmented by 
interest rate smoothing) and of the fiscal rule augmented with lagged values of 
government revenue scaled by output towards and determining the monetary-fiscal 
policy interactions in the WAMZ as well as testing monetary dominance which is the 
ultimate for countries seeking to come together in a monetary integration. Evidence 
gathered from the interactions of monetary and fiscal policies across the WAMZ are 
strong enough to suggest that The Gambia and Ghana have strong monetary dominance 
(the Ricardian equivalence) in the two estimated regimes. Nigeria, the lead economy 
only exhibit monetary dominance in regime 1. All the WAMZ countries display 
monetary dominance in Regime 2 apart from Nigeria which manifests the ‘indeterminacy’ status in Regime 2. None of the WAMZ countries have the explosive and the ‘Non-Ricardian’ postures. Given the high probability of staying in either of the 
regime, for the six WAMZ countries, these results are good enough for the membership 
of the proposed monetary integration of West Africa. 
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Appendix 1 
Figure 1: Markov Switching Smoothed Regime Probability for Monetary Regime of The Gambia 
 
Figure 2: Markov Switching Smoothed Regime Probability for Monetary Regime of Ghana 
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Figure 3: Markov Switching Smoothed Regime Probability for Monetary Regime of Guinea 
 
Figure 4: Markov Switching Smoothed Regime Probability for Monetary Regime of Liberia 
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Figure 5: Markov Switching Smoothed Regime Probability for Monetary Regime of Nigeria
 
 
Figure 6: Markov Switching Smoothed Regime Probability for Monetary Regime of Sierra Leone 
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Appendix 2 
Figure 7: Markov Switching Smoothed Regime Probability for Fiscal Regime of The Gambia 
 
Figure 8: Markov Switching Smoothed Regime Probability for Fiscal Regime of Ghana 
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Figure 9: Markov Switching Smoothed Regime Probability for Fiscal Regime of Guinea 
 
Figure 10: Markov Switching Smoothed Regime Probability for Fiscal Regime of Liberia 
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Figure11: Markov Switching Smoothed Regime Probability for Fiscal Regime of Nigeria 
 
Figure 12: Markov Switching Smoothed Regime Probability for Fiscal Regime of Sierra Leone 
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